Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 36
Issue 4 Issue 4 - May 1983

Article 2

5-1983

Independent Political Action Groups: New Life for the Fairness
Doctrine
Charles D. Ferris
L. Gregory Ballard

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Communications Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Charles D. Ferris and L. Gregory Ballard, Independent Political Action Groups: New Life for the Fairness
Doctrine, 36 Vanderbilt Law Review 929 (1983)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol36/iss4/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information,
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

Independent Political Action
Groups: New Life for the Fairness

Doctrine
Charles D. Ferris* and L. Gregory Ballard**
During the past decade, independent political action committees
(PACs) have grown dramatically as an alternative source of funding
for political candidates. Congress and many commentators have expressed fear over the potential political power of these independent
expenditure groups, which are not accountable to politicalparties. In
their Article Messrs. Ferris and Ballard argue that the political broadcasting laws, particularlythe FairnessDoctrine, serve as essential barriers to PACs' attempts to dominate the politicalprocess through unrestricted spending on political advertising. Although some critics
have denounced the Fairness Doctrine, which requires broadcastersto
provide balanced coverage of controversialissues, as outdated and unnecessary, Messrs. Ferrisand Ballard argue that the doctrine may indeed provide an effective means for balancing the public's need for
information, the broadcasters'editorialfreedom, and the PACs' rights
to free expression.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The rise of independent political action committees
(PACs)-groups that organize under the Federal Election Campaign Act of 19711 (FECA) to support or oppose political candidates or issues-and the viability of the Fairness Doc* Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, 1977-81. A.B., 1954, Boston
College; J.D., 1961, Boston College. Mr. Ferris is now with the Washington office of Mintz,
Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky, and Popeo, P.C.
** Assistant General Counsel, Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. B.A., 1975, University
of Redlands; J.D., 1979, Harvard School of Law. The views expressed are those of the author
and do not represent the views of Turner Broadcasting System, Inc.
1. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The Act defines "political committee"
as "any committee, club, association, or other group of persons which receives contributions
or makes expenditures during a calendar year in an aggregate amount exceeding $1,000." Id.
§ 431(d). Business, labor, professional, agrarian, ideological, or issue groups form PACs to
aggregate small contributions from their members, stockholders, or employees into larger,
more meaningful amounts. The PACs then contribute these funds to selected candidates or
political party committees. Alexander, The Obey-Railsback Bill: Its Genesis and Early
History, 22 Ajuz. L. Rav. 653, 653 (1980).
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trine-broadcasters' statutory obligation to cover with reasonable
balance controversial issues'-are seemingly independent topics
that have generated considerable debate in recent years. While
many observers have overlooked the close relationship between
these topics, this Article illustrates that the often maligned Fairness Doctrine serves as an essential barrier to PACs' attempts to
dominate the political process through unrestricted spending on
political advertising.
The explosive growth of PACs during the past decade is primarily the result of changes in campaign finance laws, favorable
rulings of the Federal Election Commission (FEC), and one United
States Supreme Court decision.3 Although FECA4 imposed ceilingS5 on political contributions and expenditures,' it permitted corporations and labor unions7 to establish their own PACs.8 Subsequent amendments9 and FEC rulings10 encouraged many other
2. See 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976).
3. See Epstein, The PAC Phenomenon: An Overview, 22 Amiz. L. REv. 355, 358-59
(1980); Wertheimer, The PAC Phenomenon in American Politics,22 ARiz. L. REV.603, 605,
625 (1980). PACs were not unheard of prior to the 1970's. Professor Epstein noted:
Except for organized labor-which has utilized the PAC mechanism as its primary
mechanism for all forms of union electoral activities since the mid-1930's-PACs prior
to the 1970's were a minor factor in channeling business-related and other social interest contributions into federal electoral politics. The federal laws that governed
campaign financing were sufficiently porous and the opportunity for individuals and
groups to donate substantial sums of money to parties and candidates sufficiently great
that PACs were not essential.
Epstein, supra, at 355-56.
4. 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a-441j (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
5. Under the Act individuals may contribute up to $1000 to a candidate in each election, $20,000 to a national party committee each year, and $5000 to any other committee
(including PACs) every calendar year. A party committee may give no more than $1000 to a
candidate for an election, or $5000 if the committee is a multicandidate committee. National
party committees may contribute $17,500 to a senatorial candidate. PACs may give $5000 to
a candidate in each election, $15,000 to a national party committee each calendar year, and
$5000 to any other committee. Epstein, supra note 3, at 360 (discussing 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a441j (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
6. The Supreme Court subsequently found unconstitutional these limitations on expenditures. See infra note 12 and accompanying text.
7. The Act also allows corporations and labor unions to use their own funds to communicate with their stockholders, officers, or members on any subject-including partisan
politics-and to conduct nonpartisan registration and "get-out-the-vote" drives among these
groups. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See Adamany, PAC's and the Democratic Financing of Politics, 22 Aiuz. L. REV. 569, 583-84 (1980).
8. Federal law prohibits direct expenditure of corporate or union funds to support
federal candidates. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See Adamany, supra note 7,
at 583.
9. See, e.g., Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455
(1976 & Supp. V 1981) (allowing government contractors to establish PACs).
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groups to form PACs. The Supreme Court's invalidation of the
FECA's spending limitations in Buckley v. Valeo1 ' in 1976 further
stimulated the growth of PACs. The Court held that the imposition of ceilings on expenditures impermissibly burdens free expression under the first amendment.1 2 Even though candidates could
spend freely after Buckley, FECA still restricted contributions that
they could accept. PACs became an important alternative source of
funds for political candidates because they enable candidates to receive money collected primarily from small contributors whom the
candidates themselves could not solicit efficiently or conveniently." The resulting proliferation of PACs is evident in FEC
statistics: from 1981 to 1982 the number of registered PACs increased from 2,901 to 3,371.14 Even more dramatic has been the
growth of "independent expenditure" groups-PACs that are not
linked directly to a particular party or candidate. 15 In 1982 alone
more than two hundred of these groups were born, an increase of
38.4 percent from the previous year. 16
Congress has debated at length the effect of PACs on the political process. Wary of unlimited political expenditures by-groups
not accountable to political parties, Congress has discussed possible means of controlling these groups. Although most of the debate
understandably has focused on reform of campaign finance laws, 7
the Supreme Court's holding in Buckley that campaign spending
restrictions are unconstitutional limits these reform efforts. Buckley, however, does not limit the separate body of communications
10. See, e.g., FEC Advisory Opinion No. 1975-23 (December 3, 1975) (approving widespread use of corporate PACs).
11. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
12. Id. at 44-45. In Buckley various federal officeholders, candidates, and political
groups challenged the constitutionality of FECA provisions that limited both political contributions and expenditures, required political committees to report to the FEC the names
of contributors of more than $1000, and provided for public financing of presidential campaigns. A divided Court struck down the spending limits but upheld the other FECA requirements, including the contribution restrictions, against first and fifth amendment challenges. Id.
13. Epstein, supra note 3, at 360.
14. 10 Campaign Practices Reports, No. 1, at 1 (Jan. 31, 1983).
15. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 11 C.F.R. § 109.1(a) (1981) for a
definition of independent expenditure groups.
16. 10 Campaign Practices Reports, No. 1, at 1 (Jan. 31, 1983).
17. See, e.g., Contribution Limitations and Independent Expenditures: Hearings
Before the Task Force on Elections, Comm. on House Administration,97th Cong., 2d Seas.
(1982); see also Adamany, supra note 7, at 597-602 (discussing stricter disclosure requirements and contribution limits); Wertheimer, supra note 3, at 621-25 (discussing aggregate

limitations on PAC contributions).
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laws that regulate political broadcasting. Although these laws precede by many years the recent growth of PACs, 8 they now temper
PACs' otherwise harsh effects on the political process. The political
broadcasting laws, particularly the Fairness Doctrine, provide an
effective legal framework for balancing the public's need for information, broadcasters' rights to editorial discretion, and PACs'
rights to freedom of expression. At a time when critics denounce
the laws governing political broadcasting as outdated and unnecessary,1 9 especially in light of new technology in the communications
industry,2 0 the communications laws find renewed justification in
their most important role ever-meeting the challenges of PACs.
Part II of this Article reviews the provisions of political broadcasting laws that pertain to PACs. Part III discusses how the political broadcasting laws, particularly the Fairness Doctrine, until
now have accommodated the challenges of PACs. Part IV considers whether broadcasting's new technology justifies the elimination
of the Fairness Doctrine. Part V concludes that balanced public
dialogue will disappear unless Congress preserves the political
broadcasting laws that serve as checks on the political power of
PACs.
II.

A.

POLITICAL BROADCASTING LAWS

The Regulation of Broadcasting in General

Government regulation of broadcasters includes not only licensing provisions, ' but also some supervision over program content.2 2 Although the first amendment protects broadcasting," the
18. Present broadcasting laws derive from the Communications Act of 1934, now codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-330 (1976).
19. Broadcasters, individually and through their trade association, the National Association of Broadcasters, long have criticized the Fairness Doctrine and other political broadcasting rules. In recent years a number of public officials--including the current Chairman
of the FCC, Mark Fowler, see, e.g., Fowler & Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 Tsx. L. REV. 207, 244-45 (1982), and the Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, Robert Packwood, see, e.g., BROADCASTING, Apr. 12, 1982, at 30; CABLEVISION, Nov. 8, 1982, at 131-have joined in the criticism.
20. The regulation of political expenditures is a relatively recent phenomenon. Only
when Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) did such regulation at
the federal level become pervasive. See 1 T. ScHwA~z & A. STRAws, FEDERAL REGULATION OF
CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND POLITICAL AcTvrry § 1.03 (1982).
21. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-312 (1976).
22. See, e.g., id. § 303(b) (FCC may "[p]rescribe the nature of the service to be rendered" as "public convenience, interest, or necessity requires"); id. § 315(a) (Fairness
Doctrine).
23. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969) (citing United States
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Supreme Court has held that "differences in the characteristics of
news media justify differences in the First Amendment standards
applied to them."2 ' Because the airwaves are a limited resource,2 5
broadcasting law has sought to strike a proper balance between
public and private control.26
Broadcasters receive licenses from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to serve the public as custodians of the
airwaves. Because insufficient frequencies exist to allow everyone
to broadcast at once, society has entrusted broadcasters to make
editorial judgments on its behalf.27 The broadcaster violates this
trust when it ignores some voices and lets others dominate the
public dialogue. Ever since government has regulated broadcasting,28 the broadcaster's duty has been to serve the public's interest
in being informed.2 While the broadcaster has wide latitude in
satisfying this obligation,"0 the Supreme Court consistently has
emphasized that the public's right to be informed is paramount.31
Broadcasters' public obligations arising from their control of2
the airwaves distinguish broadcasting from the print media.

Nonetheless, some critics argue that the broadcast industry is not
essentially different from the newspaper industry and hence, the
v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948)).
24. 395 U.S. at 386-87 (citing Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503
(1952)).
25. Prior to the Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927), unrestricted use of
the limited airwaves caused chaos. "It quickly became apparent that broadcast frequencies
constituted a scarce resource whose use could be regulated and rationalized only by the
Government. Without government control, the medium would be of little use because of the
cacaphony of competing voices, none of which could be clearly and predictably heard." Red
Lion, 395 U.S. at 376.
26. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Natl Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 112
(1973).
27. See 395 U.S. at 387-91.
28. The Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927), began the era of regulation.
29. "It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic,
moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here." Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
30. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 111.
31. See, e.g., id. at 113-14; Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
32. As one court noted:
A broadcaster has much in common with a newspaper publisher, but he is not in the
same category in terms of public obligations imposed by law. A broadcaster seeks and
is granted the free and exclusive use of a limited and valuable part of the public domain; when he accepts that franchise it is burdened by enforceable public obligations.
A newspaper can be operated at the whim or caprice of its owners; a broadcast station
cannot.
Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1003 (D.C.
Cir. 1966).
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government should treat both industries the same way. 3 These
critics point out that television stations often outnumber newspapers in a town. This analysis, however, confuses the relevant markets. The appropriate market to compare with the television industry is not the newspaper industry, but the entire print industry,
which encompasses much more than newspapers alone. The print
industry is highly competitive; over 9,000 newspapers (including
dailies, weeklies, and semi-weeklies) and almost 11,000 periodicals
are published in this country." Local newspapers compete not only

with national daily newspapers and local weeklies, but also with
magazines, newsletters, trade journals, and books. National newspapers such as The Washington Post must compete with The New
York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Los Angeles Times,
and other newspapers from other cities. Unlike television, the variety of information and viewpoints available from the print industry is inexhaustible. Until enough different electronic sources of
information exist to ensure a well-informed public, a higher level
of regulation for broadcasting is warranted.
B. Reasonable Access
The first provision of political broadcasting laws pertinent to
PACs is the "reasonable access" requirement of section 312(a)(7)
of the Communications Act of 1934.11 This measure requires
broadcasters to provide candidates for federal office "reasonable
access" to broadcasting facilities.3 Recently upheld by the Supreme Court in CBS, Inc. v. FCC, section 312(a)(7) embodies a
33. See, e.g., F.C.C. Asks End To FairnessEqual Time Rules, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18,
1981, at 13, col. 1 (quoting Mark S. Fowler, Chairman of the FCC: "The scarcity-of-mediaaccess argument is a bankrupt one. It is about time that media got the same rights to select
material as newspapers, book publishers and others.") See also Note, The Fairness Doctrine: Fairto Whom?, 30 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 485, 519-21 & n.196 (1981) (advocating repeal of
the Fairness Doctrine). See generally Fowler & Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to
Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEx. L. Rav. 207 (1982) (proposing deregulation of commercial
broadcasting).
34. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPr. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 1982-1983 at 561 (103d ed. 1982).
35. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1976).
36. 453 U.S. 367 (1981). In December 1979 the Carter/Mondale Campaign Committee
had attempted to purchase 30 minutes of air time between 8:00 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. from
each of the three major networks. After the networks refused, the Committee complained to
the FCC that the networks had violated their duty to provide "reasonable access" to legally
qualified federal candidates. The Commission agreed and issued an order mandating that
the networks comply with their statutory obligation. Id. at 374. The Supreme Court held
that the Commission's application of § 312(a)(7) did not unduly restrict the networks' editorial discretion under the first amendment. Id. at 396.
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delicate balancing of three first amendment interests: the candidate's interest in reaching the electorate with his message, the editorial freedom of broadcasters, and the public's right to hear an
uncensored and meaningful presentation of a candidate's views.7

A broadcaster may not refuse perfunctorily to allow any candidate
for federal office to use its facilities; qualified candidates thus have
an affirmative, limited right to reasonable access to the airwaves.38
The provision, however, does not give the same right of access to
groups or individuals who are not seeking election to a federal
39

office.

C. Equal Opportunities
The second broadcasting provision that affects PACs is the
"equal opportunities" provision of section 315(a) of the 1934 Communications Act.40 Although frequently referred to as the "equal
time" provision, section 315 does not literally compel broadcasters
to provide equal time. Rather, the provision requires that once a
broadcaster has allowed any candidate to "use

'41

its facilities, it

must provide opposing candidates an opportunity to use time that
is equally desirable. 42 If a candidate chooses to forego this opportunity-for instance, if he cannot afford the time or chooses to spend
limited funds elsewhere-the broadcaster has no further obligation
under section 315(a).
In enacting the equal opportunity provision Congress sought
to prevent a broadcaster from using its facilities to forward the
candidacy of any one particular candidate.4 A broadcaster's exercise of political favoritism certainly would violate the public re37. Id. at 395-97.
38. Id. at 396.
39. National Conservative Political Action Comm. (NCPAC), 89 F.C.C.2d 626, 627-29,
petition for review dismissed, No. 92-1579 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 14, 1982); Honorable Thomas F.
Eagleton, 81 F.C.C.2d 423, 425 (1980). See infra notes 67-84 and accompanying text.
40. "If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any
public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other
such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station .... " 47 U.S.C. §
315(a) (1976).
41. Equal opportunity applies only when the broadcast is a "use"--an identifiable appearance by the candidate by voice or picture. Thus, it does not apply to broadcasts on the
candidate's behalf in which he does not appear. See, e.g., Public Notice, Use of Broadcast
Facilities by Candidates for Public Office, 24 F.C.C.2d 832, 838 (1970); See infra text accompanying notes 60-61.
42. See, e.g., Public Notice, Use of Broadcast Facilities by Candidates for Public Office, 24 F.C.C.2d 832, 869 (1970); Major General Harry Johnson, 40 F.C.C. 323 (1961); E.A.
Stephens, 11 F.C.C. 61 (1945).
43. Carter/Mondale Reelection Comm., Inc., 81 F.C.C.2d 409, 415 (1980).
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sponsibility that accompanies the broadcast license. The law, however, does not require a broadcaster to subsidize a candidate who
cannot afford air time. A broadcaster need not provide free time to
a candidate unless it already has given free time to an opposing
candidate.4 4
D. FairnessDoctrine
The third broadcasting provision relevant to PACs is the Fairness Doctrine, which is also codified in section 315(a) of the Communications Act. 45 Unlike the reasonable access and equal opportunity provisions, which apply to candidates, the Fairness Doctrine
applies to issues and ideas. The obligations that the doctrine imposes on broadcasters are simple: a broadcaster must cover controversial issues of public importance, and the coverage must provide
a reasonable opportunity for the presentation of contrasting
views. 46 The first part of this doctrine, the obligation to provide
coverage of controversial issues, is rarely the source of dispute,47
and broadcasters enjoy, within reason, almost unlimited discretion
in determining what issues are controversial and thus within the
doctrine's coverage. 48 On the other hand, the second part of the
Fairness Doctrine, which imposes a duty to provide reasonable balance in presenting those controversial views that the broadcaster
chooses to air, has spawned considerable and continuing debate.
Some critics claim that this requirement of balance excessively restricts a broadcaster's editorial freedom.4 9 Proponents of the rule
maintain that protecting the public's access to a variety of views
on critical issues justifies the balance requirement. 50 Both the doctrine's opponents and supporters rely on the first amendment right
of free speech in defending their positions. The Fairness Doctrine
44. Id. at 416. See infra notes 86-94 and accompanying text.
45. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976).
46. The Handling of Pub. Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Pub. Interest
Standards of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974); see Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Pub. Importance (Fairness Primer),
40 F.C.C. 598 (1964); Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).
47. But see Complaint of Representative Patsy Mink, 59 F.C.C.2d 987 (1976) (West
Virginia station must cover strip mining issue).
48. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S.
112 (1973); American Sec. Counsel Educ. Found. v. FCC, 607 F.2d 438 (1979); The Handling
of Pub. Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Pub. Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974).
49. See supra note 19.
50. See 48 F.C.C.2d at 6, 11; Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246,
1249, 1256 (1949).
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actually incorporates two first amendment interests by balancing
the broadcaster's right to speak and the public's right to hear.
Neither broadcasters' nor the public's right to the airwaves is
exclusive.5 1
The FCC in 1963 articulated an important clarification to the
Fairness Doctrine known as the Cullman Doctrine. In Cullman
BroadcastingCo. 52 the Commission ruled that if a broadcaster airing one side of a controversial issue in a paid advertisement cannot
find a paying sponsor to express contrasting views, the broadcaster
must either air the contrasting views itself or provide free time for
appropriate proponents of those views.5 The broadcaster cannot
leave the public uninformed simply because no one will pay to
inform."
A corollary of the Fairness Doctrine is the Zapple Doctrine,
which was the product of a 1970 FCC ruling55 that addressed a
broadcaster's obligations after it sells time to a candidate's supporters during a political campaign. The FCC in Nicholas Zapple
ruled that a broadcaster selling time to supporters of one candidate must offer equal opportunities to supporters of opposing candidates . This aspect of Zapple led the Commission to characterize the doctrine as a "quasi-equal opportunities" corollary to the
Fairness Doctrine.5 7 The Zapple Doctrine operates as a bridge between the general Fairness Doctrine and the political equal opportunities provision of section 315(a).58 Without Zapple a political
candidate would have no right to equal opportunities unless his
opponent's political advertisement constituted a "use" of broadcast facilities.5 9 The FCC defines a "use" as an identifiable appearance of a candidate by voice or picture, 0 regardless whether the
51. The Supreme Court, however, has concluded that "[i]t is the right of the viewers
and the listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
52. See Cullman Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 576 (1963).

53.

Id. at 577.

54. Id.
55. Nicholas Zapple, 23 F.C.C.2d 707 (1970).
56. Id. at 708.

57. See The Handling of Pub. Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Pub. Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 36 F.C.C.2d 40, 41 (1972).
58. "Zapple was neither traditional fairness nor traditional equal opportunities. It was
a particularization of what the public interest calls for in certain political broadcast situations in light of the Congressional policies set forth in Section 315(a)." Id. at 49.

59. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
60. See Public Notice, The Law of Political Broadcasting and Cablecasting, 69
F.C.C.2d 2209, 2240 (1978). Section 315 exempts four uses from the equal opportunities

requirement:

(1) bona fide newscasts; (2) bona fide news interviews; (3) bona fide news
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candidate has sponsored the advertisement or the appearance pertains to the campaign.6 1 Under a traditional interpretation of section 315(a), the airing of political advertisements in which the candidate does not appear is not a "use" by that candidate and,
consequently, does not trigger his opponent's right to equal opportunities. The Zapple Doctrine prevents a candidate from rendering the section 315(a) equal opportunities provision inapplicable
by deliberately failing to appear on ads that his supporters
purchase; Zapple thus extends equal opportunities to political
broadcasting in which no "use" occurs.
Although Zapple effectively expands the scope of a broadcaster's equal opportunities obligations, one aspect of the doctrine
limits those duties. A broadcaster must provide only an equal opportunity for the opposing candidate's supporters to purchase
comparable broadcast time; the broadcaster need not provide for a
free response.0 2 The FCC in Zapple specifically refused to extend
the CuIlman free time principle to paid advertisements by a candidate's supporters during an active political campaign.6 5 The Commission stated clearly that the Cullman Doctrine should not apply
in the "direct political arena"64 and that the FCC should not intrude into political campaign financing by forcing a broadcaster to
subsidize an opposing candidate's campaign. 5 At present, this exception to Cullman applies only during election periods.6 6
documentaries; and (4) on the spot coverage of bona fide news events. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)
(1976).
61. See, e.g., Adrien Weiss, 58 F.C.C.2d 342, petition to review denied, 58 F.C.C.2d
1389 (1976) (broadcast of Ronald Reagan's movies constituted "use").
62. Nicholas Zapple, 23 F.C.C.2d at 708.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Of course, the issue of when an election period has begun raises further questions.
For purposes of the equal opportunities provision, the relevant election period begins only
when at least two people qualify as candidates and oppose each other. Before a primary,
the equal opportunities rule applies only to the candidates competing against each other in
the primary; Republicans and Democrats do not oppose each other until the nomination
process has yielded its choices. See Richard B. Kay, 24 F.C.C.2d 426, 426, aff'd sub. nom.
Kay v. FCC, 443 F.2d 638, 645 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The determination when the final interparty
election has begun is an objective one based solely upon the existence of two or more competing candidates.
Access rights under § 312(a)(7) also begin at the commencement of the election period.
In Carter/Mondale Presidential Comm., Inc., v. ABC, CBS & NBC Television Networks, 74
F.C.C.2d 657 (1979), which the Supreme Court affirmed in CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367
(1981), the Commission examined criteria such as the number of announced and campaigning candidates, the degree of media attention, and the proximity of caucuses and primaries
to determine objectively whether the election period had begun. 74 F.C.C.2d at 643-50. In
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UNDER THE POLITICAL BROADCASTING

LAWS

Access Rights
The political braodcasting laws' effect upon PACs differs from
the impact of the laws on candidates for political office, even
through PACs often support political candidates. The chief practical difference between the legal treatment of candidates and independent groups concerns access to the broadcast medium. On request a federal candidate may obtain "reasonable access" to a
A.

broadcaster's facilities in order to air his views . 7 Further, to pro-

tect a candidate's message from alteration, section 315 of the Communications Act provides a candidate an enforceable right to present an uncensored statement to the public."8 Of course, since the
broadcaster cannot censor the candidate's message, the broadcaster is not liable for its content." PACs, in contrast, have no independent rights of access to the airwaves. The groups do have
some rights to freedom of expression, as the Supreme Court in
Buckley v. Valeo70 recognized when it invalidated spending limits
on independent groups. 1 A PAC's rights, however, do not include
an automatic right to expression on television or radio."2 The first
amendment does not prohibit broadcasters from refusing to open
their facilities to PACs, other groups, or members of the general
public. 3
The Supreme Court's 1973 decision in Columbia Broadcasting
the Carter-Mondale case, CBS and the other networks insisted that a proposed Carter/
Mondale commercial designed to air three months before the Iowa caucuses was too early
because the election season had not begun. 74 F.C.C.2d at 632. Ironically, the same networks
now are pleading to the FCC that "electioneering is a continuing process," that Zapple
should apply at all times, and that the networks need only provide equal opportunities to
purchase time in response to PAC advertisements. The networks have made these pleas in
seeking reversal of the FCC's decision in National Conservative Political Action Comm.
(NCPAC), 89 F.C.C.2d 626, petition for review dismissed, No. 92-1579 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 14,
1982). For a discussion of the NCPAC decision, see infra notes 80-83, 99-103 and accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
68. "[S]uch licensee shall have no power of censorship over the material broadcast
under the provisions of this section." 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976).
69. Farmers' Educ. and Coop. Union of Am. v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959).
70. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
71. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
72. National Conservative Political Action Comm. (NCPAC), 89 F.C.C.2d 626, 628, petition for review dismissed, No. 92-1579 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 14, 1982). See infra notes 80-83 and
accompanying text.
73. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 114-15
(1973). See infra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
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System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee7 4 has blocked re-

cent efforts by independent PACs to gain mandatory access rights.
Prior to the institution of this lawsuit, the Democratic Party and
the Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace (BEM) each had
attempted unsuccessfully to buy air time to present its views on
controversial

public issues .7 The Supreme Court held that

mandatory paid access to broadcasting facilities for groups wishing
to address public issues is unnecessary to achieve the first amendment goal of diverse speech.7 e The Court feared that under a system of mandatory paid access discussions of trivial private disputes would replace dialogue on public issues.7 Moreover, the
Court perceived that a general right of paid access would allow the
wealthy to dominate discussion of public issues.78 The Court de-

cided to preserve the present system in which the public relies
upon broadcasters' editorial judgment to ensure a full and fair debate of public issues.
In 1982 the FCC in National Conservative Political Action
Committee (NCPAC) 80 reiterated the Court's denial in Columbia
Broadcasting System of mandatory access for anyone other than
federal candidates. NCPAC had attempted to air a series of paid
political advertisements opposing several incumbent legislators.
Although some stations accepted the ads, many broadcasters refused access to NCPAC. The group sought a ruling from the FCC
that it had a "reasonable right of access" to the air wavessl-a
right that several stations had violated by refusing to broadcast the
NCPAC ads. Relying on Columbia BroadcastingSystem, the FCC
ruled that NCPAC has no right of access to the air waves.8 2 The
74.
75.

412 U.S. 94 (1973).
The Democratic National Committee (DNC) had planned to purchase time from

radio and television stations and from the national networks to present its views and to
solicit funds. Anticipating difficulty, the DNC requested a declaratory ruling from the FCC
that the Communications Act or the first amendment precludes a licensee from having a
general policy of refusing to sell time to "responsible entities" wishing to present their views
on public issues. Id. at 99. The Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace (BEM) filed a
complaint with the FCC claiming that a radio station had violated the first amendment by
refusing to sell BEM a series of one-minute spot announcements that would enable the
organization to express its views on Vietnam. Id.
76.

Id. at 121-22.

77. Id. at 125.
78.

Id. at 124.

79. Id. at 126.
80. 89 F.C.C.2d 626, petition for review dismissed, No. 92-1579 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 14,
1982).
81.

Id. at 627.

82. Id. at 628. NCPAC filed a Petition for Review of the Commission's decision, Na-
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Commission noted that no statutory, judicial, or administrative authority supports the proposition that the "reasonable access" provision of the Communications Act compels broadcasters to accept
the advertisements of any individual or group, other than a candidate for federal office. 83 Thus, a broadcaster is free to donate, sell,
or refuse air time to PACs. Further, because PACs lack a candidate's right to an uncensored presentation, a broadcaster airing
PAC ads may be liable for an ad's defamatory content.8 4 This vulnerability to lawsuit provides a disincentive for broadcasters to accept PAC commercials that attack opposing candidates.
B. Equal Opportunities
Unlike candidates, independent PACs generally have no right
to equal opportunities to respond following a candidate's "use" of
a broadcast facility; equal opportunities is a personal right of opposed candidates and their authorized committees.8 5 The Zapple
Doctrine, however, prompted the FCC in Carter/MondaleReelection Committee8" to qualify this general rule when an independent
group sponsors a "use" by a candidate.87 The Carter/Mondale Reelection Committee was seeking free time to respond to ads that
promoted challenger Ronald Reagan and that supposedly "independent" Reagan supporters had purchased. The Committee argued that because campaign finance laws restricted the candidates'
resources, 88 allowing "independent" Reagan supporters to pay for
Reagan advertisements unfairly supplemented the Reagan camtional Conservative Political Action Comm. (NCPAC) v. FCC, No. 92-1579 (D.C. Cir. Sept.
14, 1982), but later filed for dismissal of the suit. The United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit dismissed the petition on September 14, 1982. NCPAC
requested dismissal because the FCC simultaneously agreed to reopen one of the central
issues of the NCPAC dispute-whether a broadcaster that accepts paid advertising from an
independent expenditure group is obligated to provide free time for contrasting views-at
the request of CBS and other broadcasting parties. These parties filed a Petition for Declaratory Ruling on July 30, 1982. For a discussion of this petition, see infra notes 101-03 and
accompanying text.
83. 89 F.C.C.2d at 628.
84. Felix v. Westinghouse Radio Stations, Inc., 186 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
341 U.S. 909 (1951).
85. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1976); see Carter/Mondale Reelection Comm., Inc., 81 F.C.C.2d
409, 420 (1980).
86. 81 F.C.C.2d 409 (1980).
87. See id. at 420-21.
88. A presidential candidate who accepts a federal grant to finance his campaign must
agree to forego private contributions. 2 U.S.C. § 441 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 26 U.S.C. §§
9003-9004 (1976).
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paign's restricted funds.8 9 According to the Committee, the resulting disparity in campaign funds violated the intent of the federal
election laws and section 315 of the Communications Act. Only
free broadcast time to reply to these ads could ensure truly "equal
opportunities." 90
The FCC denied the Carter/Mondale Reelection Committee's
request, holding that broadcasters airing an independent political
group's advertisements must offer the opposing candidate only
equal opportunities to purchase comparable time."1 The Commission noted that the purpose of section 315's equal opportunities
provision is not to compel broadcasters to equalize financial disparities between opposing candidates by subsidizing one candidate's campaign, but rather to prevent broadcasters from discriminating against competing candidates.9 2 The Commission, however,
recognized that should the opposed candidate or his authorized
committee choose not to purchase time to respond to the independent group's advertisements, a group of the opposed candidate's
supporters might purchase time for the candidate.9 The Court in
Zapple had ensured "quasi-equal opportunities" for a candidate's
supporters to purchase time to respond when the initial broadcast
technically was not a "use" by the candidate's opponent. Under
the same principles, the Carter/MondaleCourt found that a candidate's supporters should enjoy a limited equal opportunities right
when the initial broadcast is a "use. '94 An independent PAC that
supports a candidate, therefore, may exercise the candidate's right
to equal opportunities to rebut attacks by other independent
groups.
C. Fairness Doctrine Obligations of BroadcastersAccepting
PAC Advertisements
While the reasonable access and equal opportunities provisions of the Communications Act more than peripherally affect the
clout of PACs, the Fairness Doctrine unequivocally applies to
PACs and constitutes a direct check on the groups' use of broadcast media. The "balancing" half of the Fairness Doctrine requires
broadcasters to provide a reasonable opportunity for the presenta89.

81 F.C.C.2d at 419-20.

90. Id. at 409-11.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

416.
416-17.
420-21.
421.
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tion of contrasting views on controversial issues of public impor-

tance.9 5 PAC advertisements, almost by definition, address such issues. An advertisement that focuses on a candidate's qualifications
or addresses any other issue central to the PAC's agenda generally
contains controversial elements and triggers the Fairness Doctrine.
The Fairness Doctrine mitigates a one-sided presentation of a
PAC's views. A broadcaster accepting a PAC's advertisement generally must provide free time under Cullman for the presentation
of contrasting views if no one purchases time to oppose the advertisements.96 During the actual election campaign, Zapple limits
this obligation so that the broadcaster need not provide free time
if the initial broadcasts were paid advertisements. Zapple's
quasi-equal opportunity aspect, however, prevents a candidate's
supporters from circumventing section 315 equal opportunities by
forming PACs to attack the candidate's opponents. 8
Recent challenges to the NCPAC decision threaten to undermine these restrictions on PACs. The FCC in NCPAC, in addition
to ruling that NCPAC and similar independent groups have no
rights of access to broadcasting facilities, held that the NCPAC ads
imposed Cullman-like free time obligations on broadcasters that
aired them, not Zapple-like obligations to offer only the opportunity to purchase time to the candidates whom NCPAC attacked. 9
The Commission did not apply Zapple to the NCPAC commercials
because broadcasters aired the ads during a nonelection period;
Zapple, like section 315, only applies during election periods.100
The NCPAC ruling means that a broadcaster frequently must provide free air time for contrasting views on the issues that an independent group discusses in its commercials. Columbia Broadcasting Systems (CBS) and other broadcasters, in concert with
NCPAC, recently have challenged the NCPAC ruling in a petition
for rulemaking before the FCC. 101 These parties contend that Zapple should govern all purchases of time by independent groups,
even during nonelection periods.102 A broadcaster that airs a PAC's
commercial, they argue, should be able to satisfy its obligations by
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
NCPAC, 89 F.C.C.2d at 629.
Id. & n.7.
See supra note 82.
Id.
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affording groups with different views an opportunity merely to
purchase time at similar times and prices. If no person or group
will pay to express a contrasting view, the broadcaster should have
no obligation-even in nonelection times-to balance the views expressed in the PAC advertisements.1 0 3
The broadcasters' argument clearly lacks credibility. If the
FCC and the courts adopt it and accordingly exempt PAC-sponsored ads from the application of Cullman, anyone wishing to
mold public opinion on a controversial issue may form a PAC to
espouse his views without triggering a broadcaster's duty under the
Fairness Doctrine to present contrary views. Consequently, the
public will remain uninformed unless someone is willing to pay to
inform them. The CBS-NCPAC proposal would emasculate the
Fairness Doctrine and condemn to historical obscurity the principles that it has served. The Fairness Doctrine is the centerpiece of
an artful and delicate balance of competing interests in a robust
and informative electronic press. The doctrine reflects society's
convictions that democracy can flourish only with constant and informed public scrutiny and that the public's right to be well-informed is essential. PAC's increasing participation in political
broadcasting demonstrates the crucial role that the Fairness Doctrine plays in protecting balanced public dialogue.

IV. FAIRNESS DOCTRINE IN LIGHT OF NEW TECHNOLOGY IN THE
COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY

Many critics of the Fairness Doctrine argue that new video
distribution technologies now provide so many sources of information that the Fairness Doctrine is outdated and unnecessary.120
These technological advances, however, have resulted only in a
theoretical abundance of viewpoints and not in real diversity. The
103. This view, however, by necessity would distinguish PAC-sponsored advertisement
in favor of nuclear power during a nonelection period from an identical commercial that a
pronuclear corporation sponsors. The Fairness Doctrine would require free time from the
broadcaster of the second commercial; the broadcaster of the first advertisement merely
would have to provide an opportunity to buy time to respond. Similarly, this view would
distinguish a pro-oil deregulation spot that a PAC purchases from one that an individual oil
company such as Mobil or Exxon sponsors.
104. See, e.g., Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 80 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (Bazelon, J., dissenting); Note, supra note 33, at 521. But see MuoJITY STAFF OF THE
SUBCOMM. ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND FINANCE OF THE HOUSE
COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN TRANSITION: THE STATUS OF COMPETITION IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY.
(Comm. Print

1981).
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critics speak of new distribution systems such as subscription television (STV) or multipoint distribution service (MDS) as though
these systems have added new information to the marketplace of
ideas. Actually, these innovations have added only more movies
and variety specials. Competition in the marketplace of ideas has
not increased; rather, the quite different marketplace of video entertainment has been the beneficiary of the technological gains.
Similarly, opponents of the Fairness Doctrine point to the advent of direct broadcast to home satellite (DBS) service as having
boosted the number of electronic sources and assured the presentation of diverse viewpoints. Although the entrepreneurial interest
that DBS has generated is impressive, 10 5 the system's ultimate contributions to public discussion remain unknown. Considerable time
will pass before DBS's actual share of the market is large enough
to justify calling the service a viable competitor of broadcasting.
Cable television, of course, has become the critics' standard
justification for relaxing political broadcasting rules.106 Cable supposedly delivers so many channels that the public cannot remain
uninformed, regardless of what material a single broadcaster decides to air. Cable television someday may deliver to the American
public the wealth of diverse information that it promises, but today the medium still is struggling to develop. At present, just over
thirty-five percent of the public receives cable television.1 0 7 Further, most cable subscribers can choose from no more than twelve
channels of programming.108 Most of the fifty and one hundred
channel urban cable systems of the future exist only in franchise
proposals. More importantly, cable television today primarily is a
new means of delivering programming. Cable has not yet become a
new source of enough diverse, self-generated informational programming to wean the American public from its dependence for
information on the three commercial networks. Instead, today's
105. During the 45-day period that the FCC established for filing applications after
the Commission accepted the application of Satellite Television Corporation for a direct
broadcast satellite service, 13 applicants filed. See Inquiry into the development of regulatory policy in regard to Direct Broadcast Satellites for the period following the 1983 Regional Administrative Radio Conference, 90 F.C.C.2d 676, 677-78 (1982).
106. See, e.g., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in Docket 83-331, 48 Fed. Reg. 26,472
(1983) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 76) (proposed Mar. 28, 1983) (proposing to examine or
eliminate certain political broadcast obligations of cable systems).
107. A.C. Nielson Report in Cablevision, Jan. 10, 1983, at 97.
108. See Amendment of Part 76 of the Comm'n's Rules and Regulations (Sections
76.59-76.63) with Respect to "Saturated" Cable Television Systems, 66 F.C.C.2d 710, 711
(1977).
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cable systems feed off the networks. Cable television systems in
many communities carry as many as six network-affiliated stations, 109 whose programs necessarily overlap. While cable systems
also may carry a similar number of distant independent stations,
the only information that these stations add is the news of those
distant communities.""' One or two pay movie or sports channels
usually occupy any unused capacity on these small systems.""
One particular cable offering that critics cite as having obviated the need for the Fairness Doctrine is Ted Turner's Cable
News Network (CNN), the largest cable competitor of the news
and informational programming of ABC, CBS, and NBC. Although
CNN currently has viewers in nearly twelve million American
homes,""' the emergence of CNN, by itself, does not mean that the
amount of information available from television suddenly has become abundant. The American public still relies primarily on the
three major networks for information. The networks have a diminishing, but still dominant, share of the electronic information market. Although hundreds of local television stations serve homes
throughout the country, each station draws its national news from
the national network with which it is affiliated. Independent stations similarly contribute little to the national public dialogue;
these stations typically rely upon services such as CNN or the Independent Network News for any dialogue on national issues. Until many more electronic video sources addressing national issues
become available, the Fairness Doctrine will remain a critical link
in the system of political broadcasting laws.
V.

CONCLUSION

Crucial first amendment values are at stake both in the
NCPAC case and in the broader debate about the future of the
Fairness Doctrine. If the CBS/NCPAC attempt to overturn the
NCPAC ruling is successful, broadcasters at any time will be able
to accept and air an advertisement expressing any viewpoint with
no accompanying obligation to present contrasting views, unless
someone is willing to pay.1 ' A reversal of NCPAC would enable a
corporation with vast sums of money to form a PAC to persuade
the public that the company's view on public issues should prevail.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

See id. at 713.
See id. at 719.
See id.
Cablevision, Mar. 28, 1983, at 70.
See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
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The very real prospect of large, well-funded groups and corporations buying huge blocks of time to sell their ideologies demands
that Congress and the FCC preserve the Fairness Doctrine. One of
the purposes of the Fairness Doctrine has been to prevent wealthy
interests from purchasing an exclusive electronic pulpit from which
to pursue their own goals.11'
Sadly, access to the broadcast marketplace of ideas never will
be equal, nor the views presented balanced, if the criteria for determining access to the airwaves appear solely on a rate card. The
first amendment justifiably protects the right of a PAC or a corporation to sponsor issue-oriented advertisements. Democracy, however, will suffer if an unbalanced and unfair discussion of national
issues dominates the national public agenda. The Fairness Doctrine moderates this threat. It does not restrict speech, but requires more speech. It does not inhibit the first amendment freedom of broadcasting, but rather safeguards that freedom for the
public. If broadcasters choose to surrender their editorial judgment
to the highest bidder, they must ensure that the American public
has an opportunity to hear other views on these issues. This responsibility is not a huge burden, but a small obligation that accompanies the privilege of speaking on the public's behalf. 11 5
The existing political broadcasting laws can continue to meet
the challenges to balanced public dialogue that PACs pose. The
laws warrant support during this time of vehement criticism. They
guarantee that opposing views will balance any discussion which
independent groups bring to the broadcasting area. In sum, these
laws, especially the Fairness Doctrine, represent the only legal barrier to independent PACs' total domination of the electronic video
marketplace.

114. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
105, 111 (1973). But cf. notes 91-92 and accompanying text (purpose of § 315 equal opportunities provision is not to equalize expenditures among candidates).
115. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.

